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Production 59
NIO # 2649-74

29 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports and
FY 1974 KEP Pilot

1. Attached for your information are 61 of the 69 draft Strategy Reports for the FY 1975 Key Intelligence Questions. As you know, your colleagues on the IC Staff have participated in the interagency fora in which these Strategies were prepared and have received copies (separately) of those in which they have been directly involved. Additionally, these Strategy Reports have been forwarded to component heads in the USIB member agencies -- as they have reached this state of working level coordination -- so that line managers are aware of the collective commitments made by the working groups as they addressed the KIQs individually.

2. Regarding the eight remaining KIQ Strategy Reports, five have been completed, are being reviewed and edited, and will be out next week. As you remember, our original deadline for receipt of the outstanding NIO/SP Strategies by 22 November was slipped a week by Mr. Colby at Mr. Stoertz' request at the 18 November DCI/NIO meeting. The three China KIQs (31, 32 and 33) are in abeyance since we are still lacking a China NIO. Steps will have to be taken in the very near future to remedy this situation either by the designation of a China NIO or establishment of some form of alternate arrangement to ensure that the China KIQ Strategy Reports are expeditiously completed.

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3. Mr. Colby also has this package of 61 Strategy Reports and -- time permitting -- is reviewing it for any suggestions/queries that he may have prior to its being addressed in the USIB arena. Given the development of the KIQ strategies -- in the main -- by interagency working groups, we would hope that the USIB members have been kept apprised by their representatives and that the package will give USIB as little real heartburn as possible. Indeed, a number of minor changes have been submitted by component heads thus far and, where appropriate, some of these ideas have been incorporated by the responsible NIO in the master tapes maintained by [redacted]. Of course, any comments which you may wish to make at this stage would be most welcome.

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4. On the subject of the FY 74 KEP Pilot, eight Part A, Performance sections have been completed and provided to your staff. While original plans had called for KEPing twelve of the FY 74 KIQs, subsequent developments made this impossible. Lacking a China NIO, no Part A on KIQ 12c could be accomplished. The press of work faced by the NIO/SP precluded his doing all three of his KIQs -- 2c, 5a and 13b -- so 5a was dropped from the KQP exercise. KIQs 11b and 23a were never baselined at the start of the KEP so these also could not be done. The sampling of eight KIQs, however, should allow the KEP Pilot to be completed. On 22 November, [redacted] provided you with the four NIO Narrative FY 74 KIQ Performance Reports.

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[redacted]
Executive Assistant
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment
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KIQ-KEP Pilot Program Baseline Report

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DCI/IC 74-1518

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Analysis of the baseline reports submitted under the KEP pilot program reveals that:

- . the baseline process, despite some ambiguity both in guidance and operation, is feasible and productive.
- . it has the capability of determining a baseline of knowledge and eliciting explicit intelligence production and collection commitments from NFIP managers.
- . conceptually, the KEP is a viable evaluation methodology, but needs some modification.

The analysis shows:

- . The information deficiencies in some cases were written too broadly and in too general terms. Overall understanding was lacking of the role of the information deficiency--to be a basic unit for tasking and subsequently measuring production and collection performance.
- . The analytical deficiencies constituted a plea for greater analytical effort.
- . The NIOs experienced minimal procedural difficulties but were not, as they must be, uniformly precise in expressing information deficiencies.
- . The Production Managers appeared to have no trouble identifying components working on areas relevant to specific KIQs and forthcoming products.
- . The USIB Committee experience was mixed. COMIREX found it easy to task program managers and coordinate inputs; SIGINT had some initial confusion; Human Sources Committee had a large number of program managers to deal with, but cooperation was generally good.

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The aggregate analysis shows that for the eleven pilot program KIQs:

- there were 49 information deficiencies identified; of these the largest number (41%) were in the political category.
- there were 21 analytical deficiencies identified; the majority (11) related to methods, aids, or management priorities.
- there were 170 production commitments made. Of these CIA had the highest share (57%); State INR the lowest (0). CIAP which accounts for 34% of the NFIP production budget accounted for 57% of the KIQ pilot program production effort.

The pilot program did not appear to stimulate any new production commitments against the KIQs.

There were 317 collection commitments made against the 49 information deficiencies. COMINT had the highest number (21%) of commitments of all sensor/techniques and indicated collection would be attempted on all KIQs. Of the NFIP programs, CIAP had the largest proportion of collection commitments (36%), followed by GDIP (20%) and then by CCP (19%). Assessments of "impact" on collection operations noted resources being committed to "higher priorities" and the need to divert resources from present tasks.

The information deficiencies did not appear to cause any changes in current collection tasking or stimulate new collection activities.

Two views on the nature of the KIQs have emerged. The first view is that KIQs should be broadly written to provide a basis for evaluating the full range of intelligence activities. The second is that KIQs must be specific to facilitate detailed analysis, including resource expenditures.

In order to accommodate both views on the nature of the KIQs, the FY 75 questions will be presented in broad terms; where appropriate, sub-questions will be developed to address individual subjects. Also where needed, deficiencies will be identified.

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As a result of the baseline experience, the guidance and instructions for preparing baseline reports is being rewritten for use in the evaluation of selected subordinate questions. The main purpose is to reduce ambiguity in definitions and terms and to clarify specific instructions for completing the baseline reports.

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This paper presents an analysis of the baseline data obtained from the pilot program Key Intelligence Questions Evaluation Process (KEP).

The KEP is designed to compare baseline data with performance data through a Baseline and Performance Report and relate associated intelligence gain to the intelligence resources expended (see Table 1). Eleven FY 1974 Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) are being processed through the pilot program.^{1/}

TABLE 1: KEP Concept. To Compare:Baseline Report

What We Know

What We Want to Know

How We Expect to Get It

Performance Report

What We Learned

What We Still Don't Know

Expectations vs. Performance

Level of Effort

User Satisfaction

. To Analyze:

The difference between performance and baseline data.

. To Relate

Intelligence resources to intelligence substance.

^{1/} There were twelve KIQs--one for each NIO--originally selected for the pilot program. KIQ 2C (Soviet intentions) was split in two by the Strategic Programs NIO--one focusing on SAL, the other on ABM. Evaluation of community performance on two other KIQs originally selected (one on economics, the other on conventional forces) was deferred.

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
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The eleven KIQs resulted in the identification of 49 information deficiencies (see Table 3). In terms of the distribution of information deficiencies by subject categories, the data shows that 41% of the deficiencies were in the political subject category, 23% in military, 10% in economic, 16% in science and technology and 10% in political/economic/military.

TABLE 3: KIQ Information Deficiencies

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^{1/}An Information Deficiency is a short-coming in finished intelligence knowledge and is, therefore, the lack of an answer, in whole or in part, to the specific KIQ.

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
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X1 Amplifying data on Baseline Section B inputs was particularly sparse compared to that accompanying collection data inputs. One may be of some interest. --- On KIQ No. 13B ([REDACTED]), CIA noted that "manpower constraints and low priorities have not allowed sufficient analytical effort to be applied to data already available for analysis."

On balance, it does not appear that pilot program KIQs stimulated any new explicit production efforts but rather that titles from existing "production lists" were "matched" to the KIQ subject.

BASELINE COLLECTION COMMITMENTS

In the KEP the purpose of the collection data requirement was to elicit an acceptance of responsibility by collectors of an obligation to attempt to collect on individual KIQs.

Number of Sensor/Technique Commitments by KIQ.



X1 *A "commitment" signifies that the program agreed to attempt to collect against an information deficiency.

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APPENDIX A

SELECTED KIQS FOR THE
INITIAL PROCESS DEMONSTRATIONS

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APPENDIX B

SUMMARY RESULTS FOR EACH KIQ

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